5 publications of Place that refer to Place (1971a). The infallibility of our knowledge of our own beliefs.
Place, U. T. (1974-02-27). Lecture 17: The categories of mental life - mental states (27/2/1974) Section 5
[Abstract]Two arguments for the thesis that a person or human organism is a spatio-temporally extended and located substance which has both mental and non-mental, physical properties (continuation of lecture 16).
Ontological taxonomy of mental predicates. Mental processes, mental events and mental states. Logical behaviourism. Knowledge of our own mental states. Mental dispositions and continuous mental states
[References]
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Place, U. T. (1974-03-06). Lecture 18: Mental processes, experience and introspection (6/3/1974). Section 5
[Abstract]Mental activities and experiences. The privacy of mental processes. The control and interpretation of experience. Introspection
[References]
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Place, U. T. (1974-03-13). Lecture 19: Perception, topic neutrality and the properties of experience (13/3/1974). Section 5
[Abstract]Phenomenalism. Topic neutrality of phenomenal descriptions. Introspective reports. The expression of pain. Dream reports. Thesis: the language we use to describe our private experiences and sensations is a metaphorical extension of a language whose basic function is to describe material objects and their properties as they exist and occur in a three dimensionally extended spatial world
[References]
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Place, U. T. (1989a). Low claim assertions. In J. Heil (Ed.), Cause, mind and meality: Essays honoring C. B. Martin (pp. 121-135). Kluwer. doi:10.1007/978-94-011-9734-2_9
Keywords: colours, mind-brain identity theory, introspection, phenomenological fallacy, topic neutrality
[References] [1 citing publications] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1989a Low claim assertions.pdf
Place, U. T. (2000d). The two-factor theory of the mind-brain relation. Brain and Mind, 1, 29-43. doi:10.1023/A:1010087621727
[Abstract]The analysis of mental concepts suggests that the distinction between the mental and the nonmental is not ontologically fundamental, and that, whereas mental processes are one and the same things as the brain processes with which they are correlated, dispositional mental states depend causally on and are, thus, "distinct existences" from the states of the brain microstructure with which 'they' are correlated. It is argued that this difference in the relation between an entity and its composition/underlying structure applies across the board. All stuffs and processes are the same thing as is described by a description of their microstructure. In all cases where the manifestation of a disposition extends beyond the "skin" of the dispositional property bearer, dispositions invariably depend causally on the structure, usually the microstructure, of the bearer.
[References] [1 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Download: 2000d The Two Factor-Theory of the Mind-Brain Relation.pdf