2 publications that cite Place (1967). Comments on H. Putnam 'Psychological predicates'.
Bartlett, G. (2018). Functionalism and the problem of occurrent states. Philosophical Quarterly, 68(270), 1-20. doi:10.1093/pq/pqx043
[Abstract]In 1956 U. T. Place proposed that consciousness is a brain process. More attention should be paid to his word 'process'. There is near-universal agreement that experiences are processive--as witnessed in the platitude that experiences are occurrent states. The abandonment of talk of brain processes has benefited functionalism, because a functional state, as it is usually conceived, cannot be a process. This point is dimly recognized in a well-known but little-discussed argument that conscious experiences cannot be functional states because the former are occurrent, while the latter are dispositional. That argument fails, but it can be made sound if we reformulate it with the premise that occurrent states are processive. The only way for functionalists to meet the resulting challenge is to abandon the standard individuation of functional states in terms of purely abstract causal roles.
[Citing Place (1956) in context] [Citing Place (1967)]
Download: Bartlett (2018) Functionalism and the Problem of Occurrent States.pdf
Smart, J. J. C. (1971). Reports of immediate experiences. Synthese, 22, 346-359. doi:10.1007/BF00413432
[Citing Place (1956) in context] [Citing Place (1960) in context] [Citing Place (1967) in context]