4 publications that cite Place (1960). Materialism as a scientific hypothesis.
Baier, K. (1962). Smart on Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, X, 57-68.
[Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (1960)] [2 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Shapiro, L. A., & Polger, T. W. (2012). Identity, variability, and multiple realization in the special sciences. New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical (pp. 264-88).
[Abstract]Compositional variation and variability in nature is abundant. This fact is often thought to entail that multiple realization is also ubiquitous. In particular, compositional variability among cognitive creatures is thought to provide conclusive evidence against the mind-brain type identity theory. In this chapter we argue that the type identity theory, properly understood, is compatible with a wide range of compositional and constitutional variation and variability. Similarly, contrary to received wisdom, variation poses no threat to reductionist ventures. Multiple realization as we understand it, requires a specific pattern of variation. Multiple realization is not self-contradictory; the kinds of variation that qualify as multiple realization are not impossible, but they are less common in general than is widely supposed.
[Citing Place (1956) in context] [Citing Place (1960) in context] [Citing Place (1988a)]
Smart, J. J. C. (1967). Comments on the papers. In C. F. Presley (Ed.), The Identity Theory of Mind (pp. 84-93). University of Queensland Press.
[Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (1960)] [4 referring publications by Place]
Smart, J. J. C. (1971). Reports of immediate experiences. Synthese, 22, 346-359. doi:10.1007/BF00413432
[Citing Place (1956) in context] [Citing Place (1960) in context] [Citing Place (1967) in context]