Related Publications

Armstrong D. M. (1997). A world of states of affairs. Cambridge University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Armstrong, D. M. (1968). A materialist theory of the mind. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [16 referring publications by Place]  

Armstrong, D. M., Martin, C. B., Place, U. T., & Crane, T. (Ed.) (1996). Dispositions: A debate. Routledge.
[8 referring publications by Place]  [Reviews]  

Cartwright, N. (1989). Nature's Capacities and their Measurement. Oxford University Press.
[7 referring publications by Place]  

Davidson, D. (1970). Mental events. In L. Foster and J. W. Swanson (Eds.), Experience and theory. Duckworth. Reprinted in D. Davidson (1980), Essays on actions and events (pp. 207-227). Clarendon Press.
[11 referring publications by Place]  

Geach, P. T. (1957) Mental Acts. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[21 referring publications by Place]  

Medlin, B. (1967). Ryle and the mechanical hypothesis. In C. F. Presley (Ed.), The identity theory of mind (pp. 94-150). University of Queensland Press.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50.
[Abstract]The revised version from 1997, see download (below), is not published and incorporates revisions proposed in Place (1997g). Publications citing Place (1956): See publications citing 'Is conscious a brain process?'
[References]  [59 citing publications]  [38 referring publications by Place]  [11 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1956 Is Consciousness a Brain Process.pdf  1956 1997 Is Consciousness a Brain Process - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1966). Consciousness and perception in psychology II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. XL, 101-124. doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/40.1.85 [this doi is for the Supplementary Volume consisting of part I by A.J. Watson and part II by U. T. Place]
[References]  [Is reply to]  [11 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1966 Consciousness and Perception in Psychology II.pdf  1966 1999 Consciousness and Perception in Psychology II - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1971a). The infallibility of our knowledge of our own beliefs. Analysis, 31, 197-204. doi:10.1093/analys/31.6.197
[References]  [5 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1971a The Infallibility of Our Knowledge about Our Own Beliefs.pdf

Place, U. T. (1987c). Causal laws, dispositional properties and causal explanations. Synthesis Philosophica, 2(3), 149-160.
[Abstract]The role in causal explanation of sentences ascribing dispositional properties to the entities involved is discussed in the light of (a) the counterfactual theory of causal necessity originally proposed by Hume (1777) and more recently by Mackie (1962; 1974), (b) Ryle's (1949) hypothetical analysis of dispositional statements. and (c) Goodman's (1965) observation that counterfactuals are "sustained", not only by causal law statements universally quantified over entities of a given kind, but by dispositional statements which are restricted in their scope to a single individual. It is argued that what is required in order to support a causal counterfactual is universal quantification over a period of time which may be as short as you like, provided (a) that it covers the moment when the event hypothesised in the counterfactual is assumed to have occurred and (b) that its restriction to that period can be rationally justified.
[References]  [6 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1987c Causal Laws, Dispositional Properties and Causal Explanations.pdf with corrections added after publication

Place, U. T. (1999a). Ryle's behaviorism. In W. O'Donohue, & R. Kitchener (Eds.), Handbook of Behaviorism (Chapter 13, pp. 361-398). Academic Press. doi:10.1016/B978-012524190-8/50014-0
[Abstract]A distinction is drawn between the OR-behaviorism of the Americans which wants to make psychology more scientific and the OUR-behaviourism of Wittgenstein and Ryle which comes from the philosophy of language. Ryle's doctrines are classified into those that derive from Wittgenstein and those that are peculiar to Ryle. The latter are sub-classified into failures and successes. Criticisms of Ryle's position by Place, Geach, Medlin, Armstrong and Martin are examined and, where possible, rebutted. I conclude that, with some important exceptions, the dispositional analysis of mental concepts survives, as does, more controversially, the hypothetical analysis of dispositional statements.
[References]  [1 citing publications]  [4 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1999a Ryle's Behaviorism.pdf

Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson.
[61 referring publications by Place]  

Ryle, G. (1954). Dilemmas. Cambridge University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations (English translation by G. E. M. Anscombe). Basil Blackwell.
[39 referring publications by Place]